African Continental Free Trade Agreement

In this essay, we center some of the intra-African trade wars in context. First, these trade and investment wars reveal the ways in which investors maneuver and respond to the hostile regulatory actions of a hegemon state by moving their investments to a friendlier economy. Our first example between Uganda falls into this category. In response to the actions of the Kenyan government, the investors secured market access in Zambia. Zambia thus became a beneficiary of the trade war between Uganda and Kenya. Second, the trade and investment wars bode well for the future of trade liberalization in Africa under the AfCFTA because this probably points to rising trade volumes between African states. Third, as we show in the context of the examples we discuss, the citizens of States that have taken the more hardline posture on the regulatory measure at the heart of the trade and investment war appear to be worse off in their capacity to generate sustained economic development. Fourth, in some cases, African trade and investment wars are caused by socio-economic conflicts. The xenophobic attacks in South-Africa are illustrative of this example. The xenophobic attacks often escalate to trade wars and retaliatory economic backlashes. Fifth and finally, we loop in the AfCFTA and arguethat the trade wars remain a threat to the realization of the promise of the AfCFTA.

January 24, 2022

We are delighted to invite you to the inaugural Afronomicslaw Academic Forum Annual Conference. The Online Conference is scheduled for the 5th of February 2022. This inaugural conference is co-sponsored by the African Sovereign Debt Justice Network (AfSDJN) and the African International Economic Law Network (AfIELN).

The conference's theme is: 'Critical and Contextual Perspectives to International Economic Law: Amplifying the Voices of African Students and Early-career Researchers'.

These recent procedural and substantive trends encompassed in the WAU conference demonstrate a renewed and welcomed interest for arbitration of mega disputes in the African continent and the MENA region, both international arbitration hubs that are gaining prominence. Whilst challenges remain, biases against arbitrating disputes in these regions are being debunked by the experience of Africa and MENA with dispute resolution, the advent of institutions and “arbitration friendly” jurisprudence.

The News and Events published every week include conferences, major developments in the field of International Economic Law in Africa at the national, sub-regional and regional levels as well as relevant case law.

The News and Events published every week include conferences, major developments in the field of International Economic Law in Africa at the national, sub-regional and regional levels as well as relevant case law.

Its prudent to address questions having to do with the sequencing of the two Phases of the protocol and whether this sequencing was opted for practical reasons or if the ratification of the first set of the protocols is a precondition for the ratification of the second. The answer to this question will inter alia have implications on which States can participate in phase II negotiations and whether or not leapfrogging of protocols is a possibility for member States. Moreover, in light of the great appetite to realize the objectives of the AfCFTA and fast track trading under this instrument, it might be worth considering what incentives (price of entry) can be set to encourage early adopters.

In addition to the pan-African convention, given the non-litigious nature of African countries, as hereinbefore stated, the jurisdiction of the AfCFTA DSM should be expanded to include private actors. The reality on the ground is that the state orchestrated bureaucratic diplomatic protection may not be a feasible option for a private party whose financial interests are at stake and need to be urgently resolved. Elsewhere, there have been calls for the establishment of an African Commercial Court as a one-stop court for the enforcement or annulment of the final award. However, it is my belief that just like calls for the establishment of a separate African Court of Justice led to, instead, the merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the African Court of Justice due to inter alia politics and finances, it would equally not be financially viable for the African Union to administer two courts, that is the African Commercial Court and the ACHPR. Alternatively, it may be financially sound to create a commercial division within the ACHPR or the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights as the case may be, to deal with commercial disputes that have commercial conflict of laws dimensions. The implication of this is that the AfCFTA DSM will still be active but only available to State Parties, whereas private actors whose home countries have made the Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights declaration can opt for the ACHPR DSM. This may act as an incentive and mount pressure on State Parties to fasten the amendment procedure of the AfCFTA DSM to expand its jurisdiction to accommodate private actors. This will give private actors an opportunity to be a major part of the dispute resolution process thus deeper economic integration. Either way, the AfCFTA liberalization agenda is achieved.

The News and Events published every week include conferences, major developments in the field of International Economic Law in Africa at the national, sub-regional and regional levels as well as relevant case law.

African nations have only marginally contributed to global warming relative to developed and emerging economies in the Americas, Asia, and Europe. However, the African continent will bear a disproportionate burden of the negative impacts of climate change. Climate-related challenges like flooding, drought, and intense heat waves will increasingly confront the continent at a worsening rate. African nations should not be expected to take the lead in addressing a climate emergency they did not create. The priority for Africa is to receive support and investment to build resilience and adapt to climate impacts.

In this piece, I argue that Nigeria’s non-compliant behaviour is prevalent and entrenched in the field of international trade law, and that this behaviour is largely influenced by Nigeria’s perception of its national economic interests, which are underpinned by the protectionist policy of import-substitution. But Nigeria’s poor adherence to international trade rules should also be seen in the context of its general lack of commitment to the rule of law.