African Sovereign Debt Justice Network (AfSDJN)

In December 2024, Angola stealthily entered into a US$1 billion one-year derivative contract known as a ‘total return swap’ with JP Morgan Securities Plc (“JPM”). The transaction was concluded at a time when Angola’s public debt was approaching 60% of GDP, intensifying scrutiny of non-traditional financing instruments that can generate hidden or contingent liabilities. Uniquely, this agreement unfolded without the usual spectacle of a traditional sovereign financing deal. There was no bond roadshow, no parliamentary debate, and scarcely any press fanfare following the event. This absence of public process meant that neither parliamentary scrutiny nor advance disclosure of potential contingent liabilities accompanied the transaction.

Recent disclosures under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have been critical in exposing these discrepancies by comparing national export data with international trade statistics. These findings have reframed gold smuggling as a systemic governance and fiscal challenge and have prompted renewed policy attention on curbing IFFs, strengthening traceability, and improving revenue capture in Cameroon’s gold sector. This update examines how EITI-exposed discrepancies in Cameroon’s gold export data have brought illicit financial flows into sharp focus, triggered government enforcement measures, and highlighted the role of global trading hubs, particularly the UAE, in facilitating revenue losses from Africa’s extractive sectors.

On the 10 June 2025, the Zimbabwean government announced that it would ban the export of lithium concentrate, with the ban is scheduled to take effect from January 2027. Zimbabwe, Africa’s largest lithium producer, has positioned lithium at the centre of its economic transformation agenda as global demand for battery minerals accelerates due to the expansion of electric vehicles and renewable energy storage technologies. This update examines Zimbabwe’s evolving lithium policy as the government seeks to maximise national benefits through export bans and domestic beneficiation requirements. It analyses the rationale, timelines and political economy of the proposed bans on lithium ore and concentrate exports, while interrogating the ownership structures of dominant Chinese firms such as Sinomine and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt.

Guinea occupies a structurally significant position in the global minerals economy as the world’s largest holder of bauxite reserves and second leading producer of the ore, which is indispensable for aluminium production and increasingly recognised as strategically important to global industrial supply chains. This update examines Guinea’s intensifying resource nationalism in the global bauxite sector, focusing on the revocation of mining licences, the resulting high-value international arbitration claims, and the government’s planned legal defence. It situates these developments within broader African debates on bauxite’s strategic importance, mineral governance, and efforts to reclaim sovereign control and value from critical raw materials.

On the 1st of January 2026, reports pointed that Zambia had become the first African country to accept China’s yuan for mining tax payments. The Bank of Zambia confirmed that payments in renminbi began in October 2025. Zambia’s move represents a significant departure from the long-standing dominance of the US dollar in African public finance and resource taxation. This positions the country at the forefront of an emerging trend in which African states are experimenting with alternative settlement currencies to manage external vulnerabilities and deepen strategic economic partnerships. Drawing largely on recent analysis of currency diversification in African fiscal policies, this update argues that Zambia’s yuan policy reflects both pragmatic responses to liquidity constraints and deeper structural shifts in the global financial order, while raising important questions about transparency, dependency and long-term fiscal autonomy. This update examines Zambia’s decision to accept mining tax payments in the Chinese yuan, situating the policy within broader debates on currency diversification, fiscal sovereignty and the evolving political economy of Africa’s extractive sectors.

In November 2025, the Government of Libya launched legal action to recover more than US$100 million in unpaid debt from Zimbabwe, adding to the nation’s growing list of creditor disputes as it struggles under a debt burden exceeding US$23 billion. As of September 2025, Zimbabwe's total public and publicly guaranteed debt stock stood at US$23.4 billion, which includes US$13.6 billion in external debt. This update examines Zimbabwe’s renewed sovereign debt challenges through the lens of the ongoing legal dispute with Libya over a US$100 million fuel-related debt originating from a 2001 credit facility, situating the case within Zimbabwe’s broader, long-standing debt crisis and governance weaknesses in public borrowing. The update further explores how the decision by the Libyan Foreign Bank to pursue litigation in the UK High Court reflects wider trends in cross-border sovereign debt enforcement and signals increasing impatience among creditors with unresolved legacy obligations. By connecting the Libyan claim to Zimbabwe’s wider external debt overhang, exclusion from international capital markets, and stalled arrears clearance efforts, the analysis highlights how long-standing sovereign debts continue to constrain fiscal sovereignty, undermine economic recovery, and expose structural weaknesses in debt management.

In December 2024, South Africa assumed the presidency of the G20, a position which ended on 30th November 2025. Addressing the issue of debt sustainability was highlighted as a key priority of the presidency. During its tenure, South Africa has taken steps such as the G20 Ministerial Declaration on Debt Sustainability in October 2025. The Expert Panel has also released its report titled ‘Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership’ in which it addresses the issue of sovereign debt in Africa and provides guidance to South Africa’s G20 Presidency on the collective measures required to unlock the continent’s global development potential. This Update will outline the background to the report within the context of the G20, particularly South Africa’s presidency thereof, and analyze its key propositions, with particular attention to whether it offers realistic pathways to debt sustainability in Africa, or if gaps remain.

On November 6 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that it had concluded its mission to Senegal which occurred from October 22 to November 6, 2025. These discussions were geared at advancing discussions initiated during the 2025 Annual Meetings on a new IMF-supported programme and to review progress on corrective measures related to Senegal’s hidden debt. The “hidden debt” in question refers to a debt underreporting incident uncovered in late 2024 from the country’s previous administration. From all indications, this scandal continues to haunt Senegal, which has recently concluded the most recent IMF mission, notably without any new lending agreements. Following this, Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko reportedly shunned any proposal to restructure the country’s public debt. He said the measure, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), would be a “disgrace” for the country. This Update will consider Senegal’s current debt landscape and examine its current stance towards arresting its debt challenges.

According to the Nigerian Debt Management Office, Nigeria raised $2.25 billion in a bond sale on Wednesday, 5 November 2025. The sale reflected what Reuters referred to as a ‘sharp improvement in global borrowing conditions’ which has lured so-called highly indebted sovereigns back to international capital markets. Notably, Congo Republic, Angola and Kenya have also sold their high-yield debt to eager investors. Others such as Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, which in a bid to assume a more conservative stance have resorted to the regional markets instead, such as the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). Nigeria's dual-tranche listing for ten-year and twenty-year bonds was oversubscribed by as much as 12 times. The long 10-year (maturing 2036) and long 20-year (maturing 2046) notes were priced at 8.625% and 9.125% respectively.

Following its 2020 default on its US$42.5 million Eurobond payment, Zambia became the first African country to experience a sovereign default during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, it has been engaged in a protracted effort to restructure its debt, notably under the G20 Common Framework. This Update explores the divergent positions in this dispute and situates the debate within the broader context of the evolving role of regional multilateral development banks in sovereign debt restructuring. It will also examine Zambia’s strategy of third-party subrogation of Afreximbank’s debt and assess whether it offers a viable path forward in resolving its debt crisis and furthering the relevance of African Multilateral Development Banks in the long-term.