African Economies

In December 2024, South Africa assumed the presidency of the G20, a position which ended on 30th November 2025. Addressing the issue of debt sustainability was highlighted as a key priority of the presidency. During its tenure, South Africa has taken steps such as the G20 Ministerial Declaration on Debt Sustainability in October 2025. The Expert Panel has also released its report titled ‘Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership’ in which it addresses the issue of sovereign debt in Africa and provides guidance to South Africa’s G20 Presidency on the collective measures required to unlock the continent’s global development potential. This Update will outline the background to the report within the context of the G20, particularly South Africa’s presidency thereof, and analyze its key propositions, with particular attention to whether it offers realistic pathways to debt sustainability in Africa, or if gaps remain.

L’harmonisation des règles douanières au sein de la ZLECAF est réelle et salutaire. Elle est une réalité puisqu’elle repose essentiellement sur la réduction des droits de douane des Etats membres de la ZLECAF. Cette réalité se manifeste non seulement par l’existence de réelles politiques d’harmonisation des règles douanières mais aussi par un domaine assez précis de l’harmonisation de ces règles. En revanche, l’harmonisation des règles fiscales est éprouvée pour deux raisons : d’abord, l’on note l’absence de politique favorable à l’harmonisation des règles fiscales au sein de la ZLECAF ; ensuite, l’on note l’absence de mesures de coopération entre la ZLECAF et les autres espaces communautaires africains au sein desquels s’est déjà effectuée l’harmonisation fiscale. Pour atteindre l’objectif d’harmonisation des règles fiscales, il est souhaitable qu’une politique d’harmonisation fiscale particulière soit menée au sein de la ZLECAF, laquelle pourrait s’appuyer sur celle déjà menée au sein de l’UEMOA, de la CEMAC.

La mondialisation a créé une interdépendance entre États sur plusieurs plans, notamment sur le plan économique. Cela s’est traduit par la conclusion d’accords économiques visant à faciliter et à multiplier les échanges commerciaux entre États. Toutefois, cette multiplication des échanges commerciaux a aussi révélé de nouveaux défis, qui semblent tout aussi importants que les retombées économiques, tels que la protection des droits de l’homme, la protection de l’environnement, etc. Cette prise en compte de l’environnement apparaît comme un élément indissociable du développement socio-économique et, de ce fait, chaque accord international devrait accorder une place primordiale à la question environnementale. C’est le cas pour certains accords tel que l’Accord économique commercial global (AECG), conclu entre l’Union Européenne et le Canada, qui a davantage mobilisé sur les questions liées à l’impact environnemental du libre-échange que sur ses retombées économique.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential to grow beyond just reducing tariffs. Its success depends on the movement of people, not just goods. Africa needs to develop a shared continental identity, which can ultimately lead to a more integrated free trade area. The African Union recognized this when it created the 2018 Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, which has experienced slower rates of adoption and ratification (Hirsch, 2021). The free movement of individuals is considered crucial for achieving the objectives of the AfCFTA and promoting regional integration. Lessons from other regional integration models, such as the European Union, may provide valuable insights into overcoming challenges and advancing the free movement agenda. These examples highlight that trust, cultural exchanges, and familiarity are crucial to a better integrated African free trade Area.

This quarterly report argues that Africa’s ongoing debt crisis is deeply intertwined with the legacies of colonialism, the political pressures of post-independence governance, and the global financial system’s exploitative practices. Recently liberated African states in the 1970s and 1980s faced the dual challenge of fulfilling liberation promises, such as expanding education, healthcare, and infrastructure, while relying on favorable commodity prices to sustain economic growth. This combination of political urgency and economic optimism led to extensive borrowing, often underpinned by forced loans and unrealistic economic forecasting.

On November 6 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that it had concluded its mission to Senegal which occurred from October 22 to November 6, 2025. These discussions were geared at advancing discussions initiated during the 2025 Annual Meetings on a new IMF-supported programme and to review progress on corrective measures related to Senegal’s hidden debt. The “hidden debt” in question refers to a debt underreporting incident uncovered in late 2024 from the country’s previous administration. From all indications, this scandal continues to haunt Senegal, which has recently concluded the most recent IMF mission, notably without any new lending agreements. Following this, Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko reportedly shunned any proposal to restructure the country’s public debt. He said the measure, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), would be a “disgrace” for the country. This Update will consider Senegal’s current debt landscape and examine its current stance towards arresting its debt challenges.

According to the Nigerian Debt Management Office, Nigeria raised $2.25 billion in a bond sale on Wednesday, 5 November 2025. The sale reflected what Reuters referred to as a ‘sharp improvement in global borrowing conditions’ which has lured so-called highly indebted sovereigns back to international capital markets. Notably, Congo Republic, Angola and Kenya have also sold their high-yield debt to eager investors. Others such as Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, which in a bid to assume a more conservative stance have resorted to the regional markets instead, such as the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). Nigeria's dual-tranche listing for ten-year and twenty-year bonds was oversubscribed by as much as 12 times. The long 10-year (maturing 2036) and long 20-year (maturing 2046) notes were priced at 8.625% and 9.125% respectively.

L'intégration économique régionale entendue comme « un processus qui conduit plusieurs économies distinctes à former un seul espace économique » (Beitone, Cazorla, Dollo, Drai, Dictionnaire de science économique, p. 290) régional représente un enjeu majeur pour le développement des États. Cette intégration économique est organisée en degrés correspondants aux différentes formes d’intégration. L’un de ses premiers degrés d’intégration est appelé la zone de libre-échange (Elsa Tapsoba, Intégration économique et normes internationales du travail en Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA) p.18). Celle-ci correspond à la zone dans laquelle est assurée l’abolition des droits de douane et des barrières non tarifaires entre les pays membres d’une communauté avec toutefois une indépendance des politiques tarifaires extérieures. Il existe plusieurs zones de libre-échange à travers le monde telles que L’Accord de Libre Échange Nord-Américain, le MERCOSUR,Partenariat Économique Régional Global (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement en anglais) et la liste n’est pas exhaustive.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) represents the most ambitious attempt to unify the continent’s markets under a single framework, with the potential not only to expand intra-African trade but also to reposition Africa within the global economy. Can the AfCFTA break Africa’s cycle of dependency and reposition the continent in the global economy? In this paper, we aim to offer an analysis of the impact of persistent colonial institutional practices on development in Africa, and the role of an African Continental Free Trade Area in articulating agency, creating shockproof economies, establishing continental trade corridors, building regional value chains, and finally asserting Africa’s position in the global economy.

Following its 2020 default on its US$42.5 million Eurobond payment, Zambia became the first African country to experience a sovereign default during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, it has been engaged in a protracted effort to restructure its debt, notably under the G20 Common Framework. This Update explores the divergent positions in this dispute and situates the debate within the broader context of the evolving role of regional multilateral development banks in sovereign debt restructuring. It will also examine Zambia’s strategy of third-party subrogation of Afreximbank’s debt and assess whether it offers a viable path forward in resolving its debt crisis and furthering the relevance of African Multilateral Development Banks in the long-term.