Public International Law

TNSC Regulation may also be at odds with values and domestic policies in third States that are affected by it, which raises the question whether at a certain point the laudable fight against corporate impunity risks becoming an interference in those third States’ regulatory sovereignty. This question, of course, presupposes a broad approach to the notion (and analysis) of regulatory sovereignty. This is because “regulatory sovereignty” is usually referred to in the realm of international investment law, with discussions centering on legal obstacles for host States to freely implement policies in light of obligations on the State vis-à-vis the investor, and its home State, respectively.

What emerges from this case law is a unitary system of sources of law, with the EACJ having the power to police their hierarchical compatibility and invalidate a lower-ranking norm if it contradicts a higher-ranking one. Such an arrangement is typical for federal states; the EACJ positions itself as a guardian of hierarchical compatibility of norms within the federal system, and consequently as a constitutional court within such a system.

“Not acceptable at this level”, a professor commented on one of my exam questions that asked students to “[d]escribe the salient features of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).” This happened in 2017 at the University of Namibia (UNAM) where, until last year, I taught the International Economic Law module, a module pitched at the level of a bachelor honors degree. The professor – an academic from a leading South African university hired to moderate examination papers from UNAM’s Faculty of Law – recommended that I tweak my question as follows: “Discuss the validity of the Southern African Customs Union in the WTO framework”.