Analysis

International criminal justice is, by common consent, to at least some degree, victors’ justice. Some have argued, however, that victors’ justice might be giving way, over time, to a more universal justice also capable of holding victors accountable. This hopeful notion is often held up by others as a specifically liberal delusion. In my current project, however, I hope to use the examples of leftist “civil society tribunals” from the late Cold War to show that this idea - delusional or not - was once actually more popular amongst radical critics of the liberal international legal mainstream. Liberals, in this period, could thus be the “realists.” I conclude that geo-political realities do not only produce victors’ justice, they explain ideological responses towards it. They have changed how double standards are perceived.

While each post focuses on distinct contexts and frameworks, several overarching themes emerge. First, the posts reveal divergent conceptualizations and applications of the concepts of double standards in international legal practice, which in turn raises further questions about how best to examine the role of double standards in fields as disparate as international economic and criminal law. Second, the posts underscore the tension between the ideals of universality and the realities of power in international law: whether in the Human Rights Council, international criminal tribunals, or through state practice, double standards reveal the gap between abstract normative aspirations and political constraints that undermine consistent and principled action in specific cases. Third, the posts begin to identify the rhetorical and practical tools used to navigate or exploit this tension. From Esponda’s exploration of argumentative strategies to Schüller’s critique of procedural openings, the posts show how states and institutions justify selective actions while striving to maintain legitimacy. Fourth, some posts broach the question to what extent double standards are a remediable aspect of practice or, alternatively, an unavoidable feature of the international legal system.

In this essay, I argue that while the Zero Draft and Elements Paper recognize the role of trade as a driver of economic growth and development, particularly through regional integration and increased trade finance, these documents fall short of addressing the structural barriers that prevent marginalized trade actors—such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), women, and SMEs—from fully participating in and benefiting from trade-driven development. To ensure that trade genuinely fosters inclusive development, the financing for development agenda must move beyond broad commitments and explicitly integrate policies that support marginalized trade actors, particularly within frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The following sections critically assess the strengths and gaps in the Zero Draft and Elements Paper and propose targeted policy interventions to enhance inclusivity in trade finance and development.

Some of the core objectives of FfD4 are enabling a renewed global financing framework that is underpinned by a commitment to multilateralism and collective action and aligned with national priorities. The African context is especially disadvantaged regarding barriers to meeting these objectives because the political elite, who set the said national priorities and spearhead ‘collective action’, is at the forefront of perpetuating illicit financial flows. The Pandora papers and similar exposés have revealed that African leaders are often at the forefront of illicitly hiding money abroad and moving it around illegally. This creates a paradox, as the very individuals responsible for driving meaningful progress in addressing illicit financial flows are frequently the biggest impediments to such efforts. Peter Ekeh’s concept of the ‘two publics’ provides a compelling theoretical framework for understanding this dynamic.

Accordingly, this article aims to situate the regulatory challenges that emanate from this divide within the international human rights standards that inform the use and development of emerging digital technologies. Given the necessity for brevity, particular focus will be afforded to two proposals set out in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Elements Paper for the outcome document of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). Namely, (1) technology transfer and (2) the promotion of equitable access to artificial intelligence (AI), including the development of a regulatory ecosystem that promotes safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems. The analysis will also briefly address the Zero Draft Outcome Document for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (Zero Draft FfD4) because it acknowledges the transformative potential of technology in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In context, the African financial architecture and AMFIs are Africa’s response to the contemporary global financial architecture with privileged hierarchies that have historical roots in the post-colonial order of the post-Second World War era. Likewise, the claim that the IMF offers concessional loans misses the point of the historical and structural privilege that they enjoy. As such, an ahistorical approach to assessing the PCS status and treatment of AMFIs creates a presumed sense of superiority in comparison to other MDBs. Further, such an approach deepens the privilege and the structural and inequity issues in the current international financial architecture.

The essay also emphasizes the importance of leveraging regional initiatives. These initiatives provide a complementary layer to global frameworks by fostering context-specific solutions, enhancing coordination among member states, and facilitating the exchange of best practices. For instance, regional bodies could play an essential role in mediating disputes between creditors and debtors and advocating for equitable treatment of African nations in multilateral debt restructuring forums. The Convention would cure this by institutionalizing capacity-building programs through regional debt advisory centers equips nations with the tools to circumnavigate complex debt negotiations.

The Elements Paper and the Zero Draft present an opportunity for meaningful debt governance reforms, yet their reaffirmation of the IMF’s central role perpetuates the marginalisation of Africa in financial decision-making. This blog has made calls for a transformative approach that decouples debt governance from the Bretton Woods institutions and centres it within the United Nations. A truly inclusive and equitable debt architecture requires decentering the IMF, establishing an independent Global Debt Authority hosted within the UN, and reforming debt sustainability assessments to reflect the needs and priorities of Africa. Without these changes, African debt-dependent economies will continue to face unjust financial constraints, limiting their capacity to achieve sustainable development goals.

In their current form, the proposals in the Elements Papers and the Zero Draft inadequately cover the complex and interconnected issues of climate finance and debt distress, which are crucial for realizing sustainable development in Africa. Therefore, the framework should leverage grant-based climate finance to avoid perpetual concession loans. Unlike loans, grants do not add to the already rising debt burden but instead offer a more stable and sustainable avenue to finance climate action. This will be important to break the vicious cycle of "borrow-and-under-develop" that continues to hold Africa back from realizing both its climate and development aspirations.