This post examines this challenge for political organs and for international law through both a practical and theoretical lens. The practical side entails a recounting of the brief life of the UN’s International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE), a commission of inquiry of the Human Rights Council on which I served in 2022 and 2023. The theoretical side builds on this case study to ask what is realistic and still principled to expect of political bodies in enforcing international law in a way that reduces the prospects of double standards. Drawing on the concept of impartiality and the unavoidability of selectivity, I argue that HRC inquiries should proceed on the basis of the gravity of violations to avoid double standards (which are distinct from selectivity).

Zimbabwe remains ensnared in a profound sovereign debt crisis that hinders its economic recovery and sustainable development. The country's debt overhang continues to undermine fiscal stability, with the national debt surpassing US$20 billion. Despite pledges of commitment to debt clearance, Zimbabwe’s efforts are slow and encumbered by internal and external challenges, including controversial domestic reforms and complex international relations. This update delves into the ongoing struggles in Zimbabwe’s re-engagement efforts as it seeks to manage its debt crisis while navigating international financial obligations and domestic reforms.

This Guest Lecture event is collaboratively organized by the Afronomicslaw Academic Forum and the Institute for African Women in Law.

Our Samantha Kanoyangwa represented the African Sovereign Debt Justice Network at the FfD4 3rd Preparatory Committee Session.

International criminal justice is, by common consent, to at least some degree, victors’ justice. Some have argued, however, that victors’ justice might be giving way, over time, to a more universal justice also capable of holding victors accountable. This hopeful notion is often held up by others as a specifically liberal delusion. In my current project, however, I hope to use the examples of leftist “civil society tribunals” from the late Cold War to show that this idea - delusional or not - was once actually more popular amongst radical critics of the liberal international legal mainstream. Liberals, in this period, could thus be the “realists.” I conclude that geo-political realities do not only produce victors’ justice, they explain ideological responses towards it. They have changed how double standards are perceived.

While each post focuses on distinct contexts and frameworks, several overarching themes emerge. First, the posts reveal divergent conceptualizations and applications of the concepts of double standards in international legal practice, which in turn raises further questions about how best to examine the role of double standards in fields as disparate as international economic and criminal law. Second, the posts underscore the tension between the ideals of universality and the realities of power in international law: whether in the Human Rights Council, international criminal tribunals, or through state practice, double standards reveal the gap between abstract normative aspirations and political constraints that undermine consistent and principled action in specific cases. Third, the posts begin to identify the rhetorical and practical tools used to navigate or exploit this tension. From Esponda’s exploration of argumentative strategies to Schüller’s critique of procedural openings, the posts show how states and institutions justify selective actions while striving to maintain legitimacy. Fourth, some posts broach the question to what extent double standards are a remediable aspect of practice or, alternatively, an unavoidable feature of the international legal system.

In this essay, I argue that while the Zero Draft and Elements Paper recognize the role of trade as a driver of economic growth and development, particularly through regional integration and increased trade finance, these documents fall short of addressing the structural barriers that prevent marginalized trade actors—such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), women, and SMEs—from fully participating in and benefiting from trade-driven development. To ensure that trade genuinely fosters inclusive development, the financing for development agenda must move beyond broad commitments and explicitly integrate policies that support marginalized trade actors, particularly within frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The following sections critically assess the strengths and gaps in the Zero Draft and Elements Paper and propose targeted policy interventions to enhance inclusivity in trade finance and development.

Some of the core objectives of FfD4 are enabling a renewed global financing framework that is underpinned by a commitment to multilateralism and collective action and aligned with national priorities. The African context is especially disadvantaged regarding barriers to meeting these objectives because the political elite, who set the said national priorities and spearhead ‘collective action’, is at the forefront of perpetuating illicit financial flows. The Pandora papers and similar exposés have revealed that African leaders are often at the forefront of illicitly hiding money abroad and moving it around illegally. This creates a paradox, as the very individuals responsible for driving meaningful progress in addressing illicit financial flows are frequently the biggest impediments to such efforts. Peter Ekeh’s concept of the ‘two publics’ provides a compelling theoretical framework for understanding this dynamic.