Symposium Posts

This blog post examined how legal and institutional barriers have affected FDI in Nigeria’s RE sector and proffered strategies to resolve the identified issues. It was established that though Nigeria has considerable potential for generating solar, small and large hydro, biomass, biogas and wind energy to bridge her huge energy gap, the current RE production from these sources is abysmally low. Meanwhile, the FDI inflow in the sector is declining despite the government’s renewed favourable disposition. The situation is further exacerbated by some legal and institutional impediments that include policy inconsistency, inadequate legal framework, corruption, ineffective administrative processes, poor adherence to the rule of law, lack of awareness and insecurity.

Sub-regional judiciaries and implementing bodies in Africa should endeavour to avoid what the Kagame Report termed ‘[t]he chronic failure to see through African Union decisions [which] has resulted in a crisis of implementation.’ Hence, ECOWAS and the ECCJ should apply political pressure on Member States to implement the ECCJ judgments. Also, dualist countries in the sub-region should domesticate the Revised Treaty and the Protocol on the ECCJ into their national laws. This will enhance the implementation of the ECCJ decisions in the sub-region.

The involvement of the private sector in this effort ‘cannot be overemphasised’. Such engagement however, requires appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure. It must be monitored; it must be properly designed, and above all, it must be inclusive to ensure sustainability. The authors of the following posts will highlight some of the elements that are necessary for achieving this delicate balance.

While the AfCFTA is most probably the next best thing in terms of economic benefits (for instance, huge trade volumes and larger financial flows) since states on the continent created the AU itself, it poses certain dangers. In particular, like SACU, the CCU envisaged in the AfCFTA Agreement will likely injure the economies of some of its member states. And, unless the AU delegates custom-design it carefully, bearing in mind the policy choices brought up in this piece and in older regional trade agreements, the CCU can prove prohibitively costly.

Nigeria is obligated under extant international and municipal laws to acidulously respect, protect and fulfill PRTD. Though PRTD created under ACHPR is legally enforceable in Nigeria as exemplified in the enforcement of right to healthy environment (also created under ACHPR) in the case of Gbemre vs. SPDC (Supra); PRTD remains unpopular in Nigeria due to lack of awareness of its existence among the Nigerian people.

TNSC Regulation may also be at odds with values and domestic policies in third States that are affected by it, which raises the question whether at a certain point the laudable fight against corporate impunity risks becoming an interference in those third States’ regulatory sovereignty. This question, of course, presupposes a broad approach to the notion (and analysis) of regulatory sovereignty. This is because “regulatory sovereignty” is usually referred to in the realm of international investment law, with discussions centering on legal obstacles for host States to freely implement policies in light of obligations on the State vis-à-vis the investor, and its home State, respectively.

African countries can, and should facilitate, access to international arbitration by their citizens whose interests are harmed by foreign investors by procuring investors’ consent to such arbitration, and by including in their IIAs investor obligations. Allowing HSCs to be able to seek remedies through international arbitration has a number of benefits.

A common African position could also facilitate a strong African influence in the international IIA and ISDS reform discussions that are paralysed by diametrically opposed positions of the different players. A prerequisite is to coordinate and put into effect the African reforms in African REIOs – ideally through the AU-, and to speak with one voice in international for a such as the UNCITRAL Working Group III. While the US, EU, and China are caught up in trade wars, this could be an opportunity for Africa to become a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker in making international investment law more sustainable - an opportunity that should be used

If Phase II negotiations on IP  will yield any positive results for West African Countries, and other regions, the discussion should begin at the regional level in ECOWAS. Finally, considering the ultimate goal of harmonising these structures on the continent (Article 3(L) Constitutive Act of the African Union), the AU’s representation is essential in these discussions, to ensure that their outcomes align with the goal of the Union.

A competition policy at the continental level is not only important to meet the objectives of the AfCFTA, but it will provide a forum to strengthen and develop existing competition regimes. The AfCFTA, creates a wide continental market and a competition policy will provide African countries with the power to police international anti-competitive conduct by pulling resources that will enhance global trade. However, for a competition policy to be effective, the AfCFTA must continue to build on the efforts made at the national and regional levels. Member States should take this opportunity and negotiate on the future continental competition policy taking into consideration the African markets and its role in global markets.