Economic Community of West African States

Five decades on from its inception, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stands at a juncture that invites both celebration and reflection. Established with the primary goal of integrating West African countries in pursuit of economic development and regional unity, many agree that the organization has made remarkable progress, even beyond the expectations of its founding fathers. It has grown from promoting economic integration, to also championing core principles of democracy and good governance. In this essay, I reflect on an increasingly important and arguably underexplored aspect of ECOWAS’s economic development agenda: intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a central actor in the law, politics and economics of the West African sub-region. Under article 3 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS aims to deepen and strengthen relations between its members with the aim of promoting co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa. This goal, if ever attainable, depends considerably on the role and power of its treaty organs, including its administrative organs, strengthening the ECOWAS legal order and thus underscoring ECOWAS relevance and power. This aim suggests the need for scholars of ECOWAS to focus attention on organs that they have largely neglected. This submission explores the growth and development of administrative power in ECOWAS. I seek to contribute to the current limited body of knowledge on this aspect of ECOWAS by sketching the outlines of the ideas that have moulded the ECOWAS administrative apparatus

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), perhaps the most successful regional economic community in Africa, at least until recently, turns fifty-one (51) on May 28, 2026. ECOWAS, which was established on 28 May 1975 was tasked with the goal of promoting economic and political integration among its member states. Specifically, ECOWAS Treaty offers a key summary of its vision: “promoting co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an Economic Union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of the peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations-among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent.”

When, in 1963, Kwame Nkrumah emphasised that Africans need to unite, he was vigorously reinforcing the pertinence of motioning the continent on the ideation of pan-Africanism, unity, and continental solidarity. There were evident implications of his rhetoric. The first is that the arbitrary borders of the continent could not continue to subsist. In his invocations, he insisted on the fact that it was pertinent to render 'existing boundaries obsolete and superfluous.' At the time this viewpoint was articulated, it met with wide agreement. Although certain leaders were persuaded that it was important to do away with the borders, others who had just gained independence from colonial powers emerged as nationalists and were determined to consolidate their victories at a national level, given that their people had fought hard to win independence from imperialism and colonial structures.

The unrestricted movement of data is a key enabler of the digital economy. However, the development of data protection and data localisation policies is becoming one major area of concern for international trade and investment. Among the mechanisms for protecting individuals is data localisation. This requires that data or a copy thereof (both personal and non-personal) should only be stored and processed locally and should not be exported for processing. The import of this, for instance, is that all data generated within Nigeria must be confined to the boundaries of Nigeria, effectively restricting the flow of data. While localisation of data has significant economic and social benefits, it is also associated with several unintended (negative) consequences, especially from an economic perspective. This is especially true for developing countries like Nigeria that is moving towards greater data localisation with several policies skewed in that direction. This contribution briefly examines the implications of Nigeria’s increasing move towards data localisation on its regional obligations for the promotion of free trade in Africa.

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Marking the first African sovereign debt default in the year 2022, UMOA-Titres, the West African market for government securities announced that Mali reneged on its obligation to service treasury bonds that matured on January 2022 in the value of the 15.6 billion CFA francs ($26.6 million). This is only one of a number of treasury bonds default projected to be in the total sum of over $31 million.

In this essay, we center some of the intra-African trade wars in context. First, these trade and investment wars reveal the ways in which investors maneuver and respond to the hostile regulatory actions of a hegemon state by moving their investments to a friendlier economy. Our first example between Uganda falls into this category. In response to the actions of the Kenyan government, the investors secured market access in Zambia. Zambia thus became a beneficiary of the trade war between Uganda and Kenya. Second, the trade and investment wars bode well for the future of trade liberalization in Africa under the AfCFTA because this probably points to rising trade volumes between African states. Third, as we show in the context of the examples we discuss, the citizens of States that have taken the more hardline posture on the regulatory measure at the heart of the trade and investment war appear to be worse off in their capacity to generate sustained economic development. Fourth, in some cases, African trade and investment wars are caused by socio-economic conflicts. The xenophobic attacks in South-Africa are illustrative of this example. The xenophobic attacks often escalate to trade wars and retaliatory economic backlashes. Fifth and finally, we loop in the AfCFTA and arguethat the trade wars remain a threat to the realization of the promise of the AfCFTA.

The newfound freedom of speech vis-à-vis currency in the African franc zone, following the announcement on 21st December 2019 in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) of the imminent end of the CFA franc and its replacement by the Eco, brings to mind the “resurgence of repressed instincts” in psychoanalysis, in other words it is giving rise to every possible or imaginable excess, especially from the “25th hour” combatants, who are only now discovering that the CFA franc is not compatible with the emergence of French-speaking Africa.

On 21 December 2019, the French President Emmanuel Macron and the Ivoirian President Alassane Ouattara announced a “reform” of the monetary cooperation relations between France and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). This reform comes with a transformation of the CFA Franc and takes place in the context of a single currency project of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The CFA Franc zone currently comprises of 14 sub-Saharan African countries belonging to two currency unions. [1] Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA),[2] established in 1994 on the foundations of the West African Monetary Union, itself created in 1973. The other six countries - Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad - are members of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). These two unions use the same currency, the CFA Franc, which stands for Communauté Financière Africaine (“African Financial Community”) in UEMOA and Coopération financière en Afrique centrale (“Financial Cooperation in Central Africa”) in CEMAC. Apart from Equatorial Guinea (Spanish) and Guinea Bissau (Portuguese), the other 12 countries have been French colonies (de facto or de jure).[3] The CFA Franc is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) (for West Africa) and the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) (for Central Africa). Each of these currencies is legal tender only within its own region, thus not directly interchangeable.